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Should We Pay for Ecosystem Service Outputs, Inputs or Both? 
 
Abstract 
Payments for ecosystem service outputs have recently become a popular policy prescription 
for a range of agri-environmental schemes. The focus of this paper is on the choice of 
instruments in contracts to incentivise the provision of ecosystem service outputs from farms. 
The farmer is better informed than the regulator in terms of hidden information about costs 
and hidden-actions relating to effort. Results show that with perfect information, the regulator 
can contract equivalently on inputs or outputs.  With hidden information, input-based 
contracts are more cost effective at reducing the informational rent related to adverse 
selection than output-based contracts. Mixed contracts are also cost-effective, especially 
where one input is not observable.  Such contracts allow the regulator to target variables that 
are “costly-to-fake” as opposed to those prone to moral hazard such as effort. Further results 
are given for fixed price contracts and input-based contracts with moral hazard.  The model 
is extended to include a discussion of repeated contracting and the scope that exists for the 
regulator to benefit from information revealed by the initial choice of contract. Results are 
illustrated with a case study of contracting with farmers to protect high biodiversity native 
vegetation that also provides a number of socially-valuable ecosystem services.  
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1 Introduction  
The provision of ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation may be seen in some 
environments as a process of accumulating and maintaining the natural capital assets that 
support ecosystem service (ES) output.  It is an investment decision that requires diverting 
land, labour and man-made capital to appreciate an ecosystem asset, which in turn provides an 
ES output.  For instance, in the case study discussed later in this paper, the ecosystem asset is 
an area of endangered Australian native vegetation that hosts unique biodiversity but also 
provides ecosystem services including regulating saline ground water and reducing soil 
erosion.  Without sufficient land and effort allocated to its protection, the state of native 
vegetation depreciates.  If the vegetation remnant is recruited into a conservation management 
scheme then both the area and its condition can appreciate, increasing the shadow value of 
this asset.  The definition of an  ES used here is consistent with Bateman et al (2011), Barbier 
(2009) and  Mäler et al. (2009).  To quote Bateman et al.  (2011, p180) “the level of ecosystem 
service ‘harvested’ within any given period can be thought of as a ‘flow’ extracted from an 
underlying ‘stock’ of ecosystem asset….”. 
 The process described is characterised by the flowchart in Figure 1.  A land area has an 
ecosystem asset of a given state as measured by a metric.  This is combined with input factors 
land and conservation effort, and through an ecosystem asset change process provides an ES 
output.  The process is dynamic, since the ecosystem asset changes through time.  Contracting 
with owners and/or managers of the asset can be used at a number of stages in this process: 
such contracts can specify the inputs employed by the land manager, the state of the 
ecosystem asset, or the ES output.  A contract can specify these variables directly as a 
requirement for a specific quantity supplied, or can incentivise their supply through prices 
paid to the land manager or owner.  In the economic model developed in Section 3, this 
relationship is simplified so that the value of the ES output is a simple linear function of the 
state of the ecosystem asset. Inputs change the ecosystem asset’s condition over time.  
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Note: the diagram indicates input decisions with a diamond;  a state variable (ecosystem 
asset) with a rhomboid, a process (the ecosystem change process) with a rectangle  and a 
flow variable ecosystem services as round–cornered rectangle. 
Figure 1 Conceptual model linking ecosystem outputs, inputs and assets 
Since the objective of Payment for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes is to increase the ES 
output, an obvious question is whether payments should be targeted at outputs (such as better 
water quality) rather than at the management inputs or actions which change ES outputs (such 
as changes in fertiliser use: Hanley et al., 2012). Most current agri-environmental policy in the 
European Union is targeted at management actions or inputs, typically because these are 
thought easier to observe, and because the ES output from a given area of land is determined 
by a wide range of factors, only some of which are under the direct control of the landowner. 
This means that output-based contracts are often riskier for the landowner than input-based 
contracts (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Moreover, it may be more expensive for the regulator 
to monitor ES outputs or ecosystem assets compared to inputs.  
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However, output-based payments have advantages (Gibbons et al., 2011). For instance, if 
essential inputs are hidden (or expensive for the regulator to observe), then paying for outputs 
may be more efficient. Moreover, farmers may hold private information on the best methods 
for investing in the ecosystem asset and producing the ES: these cannot be easily specified in 
an actions-based contract. Output-based payments encourage land managers to make use of this 
information to produce ES outputs.  
One economic approach to the design of voluntary agri-environmental schemes is based around 
mechanism design, structuring contracts to induce a dominant-strategy Bayesian equilibrium in 
games of incomplete information (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  This mechanism is applied to 
define a menu of contracts that is designed to separate “types” of supplier by voluntary self-
selection, as a means of reducing information rents. We follow this approach in the model set 
out in section 3. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief literature review.  
Section 3 presents the models.  The first subsection gives the derivation of the compliance cost.  
The next sets out the first-best perfect information solution.  The hidden information contracting 
problem is analysed using input, output and mixed contracts.  An alternative price-based 
contract is then analysed which is characterised as one approach to overcoming moral hazard.  
Moral hazard is also addressed directly as a problem of allocating monitoring resources.  The 
last subsection considers the input-based contract over two periods with the possibility of re-
contracting. Section 4 gives an empirical example.  Section 5 concludes and identifies areas for 
further research. 
2 Literature Review  
Weitzman (1974, p477) stated that the “..average economist in the Western marginalist 
tradition has at least a vague preference toward indirect control by prices, just as the typical 
non-economist leans toward the direct regulation of quantities.” .  He demonstrates an 
equivalence, under certain restrictive assumptions, between setting the price of a good or 
service and leaving the firm to maximize profit by adjusting output; or fixing output and 
leaving the firm to minimize costs. He then states that any advantage of one policy over 
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another must “ be due to inadequate information or uncertainty.” This paper, along with the 
literature on procurement and contracting (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Laffont and Martimort, 
2002) has led to a number of papers applying mechanism design to agri-environmental polices 
(Wu and Babcock, 1996 and Moxey et al., 1999;  Ferraro, 2008; Hanley et al., 2012 and 
Miteva et al., (2012).  
Recent papers that have specifically looked at the optimal selection of alternative policy 
mechanisms include Melkonyan and Taylor (2013).  They show in relation to policy for US 
ranchland that, given informational asymmetries between ranchers and regulators, outcome- 
based payments are a first-best policy when regulators can perfectly monitor the ecological 
condition of the ranch.  Where monitoring is imperfect, input regulation and cost-sharing or 
taxation may dominate performance regulation. Anthon et al. (2010) consider the optimal 
design of PES-type contracts to private landowners under asymmetric information. They find 
foresters who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered output-
based contracts. Derissen and Quaas (2013) extend a model by Zabel and Roe (2009) to 
develop a mixed output-based and input-based contracting approach to a problem where the 
farmer is better informed about environmental performance than the regulator.  Their model 
addresses asymmetric information relating to the marginal productivity of the “ecosystem 
production function”.  Under such conditions, they show that a mixed contract on inputs and 
output is preferred.  
Dynamic contracting, commitment and renegotiation is critical to the long term protection of 
ecosystem assets, as positive change is often gradual and degradation rapid and irreversible.  
However, there has been a limited application of principal-agent models from general 
economics (Laffont and Tirole, 1988, 1990) to long term contracting for ecosystem services. 
The key issues in this literature (Rey and Salanie, 1990 and 1996) are the role of commitment 
by the regulator to set up separating contracts and the use of spot contracts as alternatives to 
long term contracts. The contribution of this paper is to take a general procurement model due 
to Laffont and Tirole (1993) and modify it in a way that relates more closely to the realities of 
ES output contracts.  In particular, we consider a situation in which there are two inputs and a 
single ES output related by an ecosystem production function.  Further, the farmer is 
represented as investing in an ecosystem asset as essential input into ES output.  These 
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generalisations allow us to explore the role of differentiated transactions costs related to the 
monitoring of contract variables.  These issues are reviewed by reference initially to a two-
type static model, and then to a two-period, two-type dynamic model. 
3 The Model 
This section sets up a general agri-environmental contract for providing ecosystem services, 
and then explores aspects of the model to assess when payment for ecosystem output or 
payment for ecosystem inputs is optimal.  Assume that there are just two representative 
farmer types that are able to provide an ES, the supply of which depends on how land is 
managed in a region. These farmer types differ according to their agricultural productivity, 
information on which may be hidden from the regulator. Thus, there is hidden variation in the 
opportunity costs of providing ecosystem inputs since the ES output requires the sacrifice of 
inputs used to produce profitable crops.  Farmers combine land and effort to invest in an 
ecosystem asset that in turn provides an ES output. The benefits can be measured as an 
ecosystem metric, where the changes in the metric can then be valued. The contract timing for 
a general problem, including repeated contracting,  is given in Figure 2. 
Aspects of the standard model that are explored here include the number of inputs, farm types 
and information.  The standard principal-agent model for procurement, for instance Laffont 
and Martimort (2002, Chapter 3), typically has a single input variable “effort”.  This 
simplification is questionable when there are multiple inputs used to produce an ES.  In our 
model set–up, one input is cheaply observableand another is not.  If there are two inputs, then 
the farm’s type may relate to land or effort productivity, the cost of producing ES output, or 
behavioural parameters such as risk aversion and time preference.   The standard model does 
not include the possibility that the regulator could select to monitor another variable – such as 
ES output - as a way of improving the cost effectiveness of a contract.  
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Figure 2 Contract timings  
3.1 Compliance costs 
The costs of engaging in providing an ecosystem service are internal to the farm business in 
the sense that the farmer allocates resources such as land and effort to maintain the ecosystem 
asset. To represent this, we define a restricted profit function (Lau, 1976) with fixed land and 
effort as 0 ( , , , , , e )x e a a a ai i ti tip w x    , where 
0  is the baseline agricultural profit.  Here, θ , 
is the farmer’s type (defined on either land productivity, xi , or effort productivity ,
e
i , or 
both), ap  are crop output prices, aw  is a vector of price for variable inputs such as fertilizer, 
and aix  and e
a
i are respectively land and effort allocated to agriculture.  The productivity 
parameters and market prices are assumed fixed in all time periods of the model. Each farmer 
can identify the optimal profit from farm production and this allows her to make a profit-
maximising choice over other variable inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers.  The restricted 
profit function provides a way of describing a compliance cost function where resources ix  
(land) and ie (effort) are re-allocated from crop production to conservation: 
 0( , , ,e ) ( , , , , e )x e x e a a a ai i ti ti i i ti ti ti tic x p w x x e         . (1) 
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Compliance cost is thus baseline profit minus profit with land and effort allocated to 
producing ES output. To make the analysis tractable we assume that the compliance cost 
function (1) is approximated by the separable quasi convex function: 
 ( , , ,e ) ( , ) ( , )x e x ei i ti ti x i ti e i tic x c x c e     . (2) 
Cost functions are strictly increasing in the type parameters. 
3.2 General contracting problem 
This section sets up the general contracting problem as a basis for considering the potential 
for different contract designs. The risk neutral regulator maximises a social welfare function:  
 
1.
, , ,
ti
( , , y ) ( , ) ( , )
(1+ )c ( , ) ( +p y ) ti ti ti ti
e x
ti ti t i e i ti x i ti
t i
x e f p
t i m ti ti ti ti
vg x e c e c x
Maximum
e x f
 
 
 

   
 
   
  . 
(3) 
The term t  is the discount factor for period t  and i  is the probability of a firm being of type 
i.1 The term v indicates the economic value per unit of increase in the ecosystem asset. The 
regulator maximizes the expected present value of the ES output given by the difference 
equation that describes the ecosystem ‘production function’or asset change process 
1,y ( , , y )ti ti ti t ig x e   for farm type i,. The ES output depends directly on the current level of 
the ecosystem asset.  The term c ( , )m ti tie x  is the cost of compliance monitoring. Policies can 
include direct contracts for land, effort or output.  The farmer receives payments either as 
lump-sum transfers tif and/or as a per-unit-of-output payment p yti ti .  In the social welfare 
function, transfers are weighted by the shadow price of public funds 10   .  This term 
accounts for the cost of raising tax revenue due to the deadweight loss of taxation (Campbell 
and Bond, 1997).   
                                                 
1 Types are defined by a combination of productivity and behavioural parameters.  Below we restrict attention to 
just two type models and only one type parameter distinguishing between firms. 
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Assuming compliance so that the problem for the farmer is deterministic, the farmer’s 
objective function is 
  , ( , ) ( , )ti ti
t e x
ii ti ti ti e i ti x i ti
e x
t
J Maximize p y f c e c x      . (4) 
The profit to the farmer when they truthfully reveal their type is indicated by the subscripts ii.   
The participation constraint is: 
 
ii iJ J  (5) 
where 
iJ  is the farm’s reservation profit.  The incentive compatibility constraint is: 
         ,ii ijJ J i j  . (6) 
The first subscript is the farm’s type whilst the second subscript is the farm’s declared type 
when selecting from a menu of contracts. The regulator acts as a Stackelberg leader (Baron, 
1985) in optimizing (3) constrained by (4), (5) and (6).  In the analysis we start with a simple 
model and develop a set of results for aspects of the general model.  
3.3 Static first-best input and output-based contracts 
Assumptions A1. The regulator maximizes the social-welfare function, and is risk neutral. 
They can also estimate, v, i , and the ecosystem production function 0y ( , , y )ti ti tig x e . The 
regulator observes the farm types. Farm types are either high land productivity h or low land 
productivity l types, with x xh l  . Each farm has an identical ecosystem asset at the start of 
the period and thus this term can be dropped from the production function along with the time 
subscript y ( , )i i ig x e . The effort productivity 
e  is the same for both farm  types, and 
farmers are risk neutral. 
If the regulator contracts on effort and land allocated to ES output, they maximize: 
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  
, ,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) -      ,
i i i
e x
i i e i x i i i
x e f
Maximum vg x e c e c x f i l h      (7) 
subject to the individual rationality or  participation constraint: 
 ( ( , ) ( , )) 0    ,e xi e i x i if c e c x i l h      (8) 
The optimal internal solution is: 
 
' '(1 ) ( , );           (1 ) ( , )          ,
i i
e x
e e i x x i ivg c e vg c x i l h         (9) 
The shadow cost of public funds increases the marginal cost of input allocations.  The first-
best policy is least cost as (9) implies the condition for cost minimization: 
 '
'
( , )
                 ,
( , )
i
i
e
e e i
x
x x i i
g c e
i l h
g c x


   
(10) 
If instead the regulator contracts only on ES output iy ,  the firm, as the residual claimant, 
produces the contracted output at a minimum cost.  Define a cost function as: 
 
0
( , ) [ ( , ) ( , ) : ( )]   ,  e xy i i e i x i i i i
z
c y Minimum c e c x z Z y i l h  

     (11) 
where z   is a vector of inputs in the ES and 0( ) { : ( , y ) }i i i i iZ y z g z y   is a convex input 
requirement set for the ES output and [ , ]e xi i   .  The modified objective function for the 
regulator is: 
  
,
( , ) -        ,
i i
i y i i i
y f
Maximum vy c y f i l h    (12) 
and the participation constraints: 
 ( , ) 0        ,i y i if c y i l h    (13) 
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The shadow cost of public funds,  , increases the marginal cost of the ES output. The input-
based and outcome-based contracts are identical as, by definition, the cost function (11) 
implies cost minimization 
 ),()1(
'
iiy ycv  . (14) 
The input-based contract is also cost minimizing as (10) implies a cost minimizing solution.  
The first-best contracts are illustrated in Figure 3.  The regulator would offer the low-cost 
farm type (l-type) the contract at a as either an input-based or an outcome-based contract, and 
the high-cost farm type (h-type) the contract at b.  For an input contract the regulator, as the 
residual claimant, sets the contracted levels of effort and land to minimize the transfer 
payment related to a level of output and thus maximize the social welfare function.  For the 
output contract. farmers as residual claimants select the cost minimizing levels of input to 
maximize their profit. 
Result 1. The first best input and output contract are equivalent and lead to the same social 
welfare, ES output and input mix. 
3.4 Adverse selection with an input-based contract 
Assumptions A2. Assumptions A1 hold except that the regulator does not observe the land 
productivity parameter directly, but has a subjective estimate of the probability i  of each 
farm type. Effort productivity is the same for both types. 
The objective function is modified to give the expected social welfare function: 
  
, ,
( , ) ( , ) ( , )-   ,
i i i
e x
i i i e i x i i i
x e f
i
Maximum vg x e c e c x f i l h       (15) 
where i  is the probability of a farm being of type i.  Thus the objective function (15) is 
maximised subject to the participation constraints (8) and incentive compatibility (IC-i) 
constraints: 
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 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )        , , ;  
e x e x
i e i x i i j e j x i jf c e c x f c e c x i j l h i j           (16) 
The assumptions of strictly convex cost functions and the single-crossing property of the 
incentive compatibility constraints ensure that the individual rationality for the h-type (IR-h) 
and incentive compatibility constraint for the low cost (IC-l) type are the only binding 
constraints (see Appendix 1).  The l-type earns a rent and the h-type has a zero rent.  The rent 
is defined at the optimal solution ˆ ˆ{ , }i ie x  by 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )e xi i e i x i ir f c e c x    .  With these 
additional restrictions, the objective function (15) can be rewritten as: 
  
, ,
( , ) (1 )( ( , ) ( , )-           ,
i i i
e x
i i i e i x i i i
x e f
i
Maximum vg x e c e c x r i l h        .  
By assumption rent for the h-type farmer is zero and from the binding (IC-l): 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) = ( , ) ( , )e x e x x xl e h x h h e h x l h x h h x l hr c e c x c e c x c x c x          . 
On this basis the optimal internal solution gives two first-order conditions, the first for the l-
type: 
 
' '(1 ) ( , );           (1 ) ( , ) 
l l
e x
e e l x x l lvg c e vg c x        (17) 
(thus the l-type is offered the first-best solution) and the second for the h-type: 
 
' ' ' 'l
h
(1 ) ( , );   (1 ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ))
h h
e x x x
e e h x x h h x h h x l hvg c e vg c x c x c x

     

      . (18) 
The second term on the right-hand side of the first-order condition for land is positive by 
assumption and measures the marginal information rents associated with increasing the input 
requirements in the contract for the h-type. This term also means that the input requirement is 
no longer resource cost minimizing for the given ES output: 
 
' '
'
' ' 'l
h
( , ) ( , )
  <       
 ( , )
( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ))
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h
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e e
e e h e h
x
x x xx x h h
x h h x h h x l h
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g c x
c x c x c x
 
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 

 

 
(19) 
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This indicates that the land to effort ratio for the h-type  is reduced due to the additional 
marginal information rent. 
Result 2 The l-type is offered the first best input level, but is paid an information rent in excess 
of the compliance cost.  The h-type is offered a contract with a lower level of land and effort, 
and their information rent is zero. 
3.5 Adverse selection with an output-based contract 
Assumption A3.  As for A2 except the regulator contracts on the ES  output. 
From an output contract perspective, the problem is re-stated as follows: 
  , ( , )-         ,i i i i y i i iy f i
Maximum vy c y f i l h    . (20) 
Subject to the individual rationality constraint: 
 ( , ) 0        ,i y i if c y i l h    (21) 
and incentive compatibility constraints: 
 ( , ) ( , )       , , ;  i y i i j y i jf c y f c y i j l h i j      . (22) 
The first order condition for the l- type is: 
 ),()1(
'
lly ycv  . (23) 
For the h- type the output is reduced compared to the first-best: 
 
' ' 'l
h
(1 ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ))y h h y h h y l hv c y c y c y

   

    . (24) 
The first-order condition above establishes a point of difference between input-based and 
output-based contracts.  Condition (24) indicates a reduction in the ES output compared to the 
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first-best, but, as the farm is the residual claimant for any cost reductions, a profit maximizing 
farmer produces the contracted ES output at a minimum cost (one of the claimed advantages 
of outcome-based contracts noted in the introduction).  This contrasts with (18) where the 
inputs are fixed by the regulator and the h- type can be induced to select an input combination 
which has a higher proportion of effort than the cost minimizing solution. 
 
 
Note:  1.  ˆ ibhy ,  indicates the isoquant for the adverse selection problem input-based (ib) 2.  ˆ
ob
hy  indicates 
outcome-based (ob). 3. The isocost curve ˆib
hc is for adverse selection input-based and includes the informational 
rent.  4. The isocost ˆobhc  is for the outcome-based contract. 
Figure 3 Input-based and output-based contracts 
All l- type are at a. The contract at b is the first-best for either input-based or output-based 
arrangements for the h- type.  Contract c is the output-based contract and d the input-based 
mechanism design contract.  The output-based contract is suboptimal, third-best, because it 
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constrains the solution to be at the cost minimizing combination of inputs, and the total cost 
(resource cost plus information rent) of the ES output is not minimized due to the information 
rent. 
Result 3.  With adverse selection, an input contract is weakly preferred by the regulator to an 
output contract, as it solves the mechanism design problem at least cost.  This result is 
equivalent to the result derived by Khalil and Lawaree (1995) for a single input model. 
Intuitively this result holds trivially because with an input-based solution the regulator can 
always select the least cost inputs. Restricting the solution to an output-based contract adds 
an additional constraint and so increases the cost of mechanism design. 
3.6 Adverse selection with a mixed contract 
Assumption A4.  As in A2, except that the regulator contracts on land and the ES output, but 
not effort directly. Effort is non-verifiable. 
Instead of contracting directly on effort, a second-best optimal effort is induced by contracting 
on land and output. Effort is selected by the agent to solve: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) argmin[ ( , ); ( , ), ]ei i i e i i i i i ie x y c e y g x e x x   . (25) 
where ˆix and ˆiy are the contracted levels. Substituting the effort function ( , )i i ie x y  into the 
regulator’s objective function:2 
  i
, ,
( , ( , )) ( , ( , )) ( , )-   ,
i i i
e x
i i i i i e i i i x i i
x y f
i
Maximum vg x e x y c e x y c x f i l h      . (26) 
The objective function (26) is maximised subject to participation constraints: 
                                                 
2 The existence of this function is easily shown for the production function 1 2ˆ ˆb bi i iy x e , rearranging effort is 
given by 1 2
1/ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( / )b bi i i i ie x y y x . 
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 ( , ( , )) ( , ) 0           ,
e x
i e i i i x i if c e x y c x i l h     . (27) 
and incentive compatibility constraints: 
 
( , ( , )) ( , ) ( , ( , )) ( , )          , , ;  e x e xi e i i i x i i j e i i i x i if c e x y c x f c e x y c x i j l h i j         
 
(28
) 
The results given in Appendix 2 show that this result is equivalent to the optimal input-based 
solution. The approach of contracting on variables that are more readily observable can be 
generalised to other contract settings, but depends on the existence of the function ˆ ˆ( , )i i ie x y , 
that relates observable variables to unobservable ones. An equivalent version of this result can 
be derived for the case where the land type is the same, but the effort type is differentiated 
between producers. This follows as the result does not rely on the observability of effort, only 
the fact that the verifiable land and output uniquely determine effort. 
Result 4.  A mixed contract on output and land is equivalent to the optimal input-based 
solution to the adverse selection problem. 
A short discussion about possible generalisations of this result is warranted.  For a contract to 
be viable, the regulator must be able to contract on sufficient variables, with active monitoring 
if required, to ensure production of the ecosystem service.  Thus, an input contract is not 
viable if one essential input is not observable or contractible.  In contrast, if an ES output is 
observable and the contract is based on outputs, this does not depend on input observability as 
the agent as residual claimant has an incentive to produce the contracted output at least cost. 
Settings where the extra information rent for a third-best output-based contract is relatively 
low and the transaction cost of observing inputs is higher than for output, favours output-
based contracts. 
In adverse selection models with two inputs the hidden type parameter could apply to land or 
effort productivity or both.  In a two-type per input or continuous type setting this would be 
difficult to analyse.  For instance, the two-type model has four types and simplifying results 
are not readily available.  In contrast, depending on the functional forms of cost and 
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production function, it may be possible to construct an aggregate type that accounts for 
differences in both land and effort productivity. For instance, if the opportunity cost functions 
are linear and the ecosystem production function is Cobb-Douglas: 
1 2[ ;   subject to: ]b bx ei i i i i i iMinimize x e y x e    
the aggregate type measure is given by:     1 1 2 2 1 2
/( ) /( )b b b b b b
x e
i i 
 
 (Mas-coll et al. 1995, p142), 
which is the standard derivation of a cost function from a production function. 
3.7 Moral hazard 
Assumption A5.  As in A2, except that effort is costly to monitor and the regulator can 
penalize the agent for the level of non-compliance (shirking). 
If a contracted input is unobservable without the regulator engaging in costly monitoring then 
this creates a moral hazard problem, as the farm may shirk on the contracted level of input 
use.  Within the model developed here, two approaches emerge for dealing with moral hazard; 
either direct monitoring with penalties, or mixed contracts where the contract specifies 
“costly-to-fake” variables such as ES output and land use. These are sufficient to ensure an 
optimal level of the unobservable variable.  If, for instance, ES output is costly to measure, 
then the regulator may have to monitor effort directly and use an input-based contract. The 
effectiveness of monitoring depends on the capacity of the regulator to charge a fine for 
applying less effort than contracted (White, 2002). Assume that monitoring frequency lies in a 
range  0 1m  and has a linear cost mc of  monitoring.  The fine per unit of effort 
undersupplied (relative to the contracted level of effort) is  .  The regulator’s objective 
function is: 
  
, ,
( , ) ( , ) ( , )-  -(1+ )     ,
i i i
e x
i i e i x i i i m
x e f
Maximum vg x e c e c x f mc i l h      . (29) 
The penalty function is defined as follows: 
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Ozanne and White (2007) show that a solution is feasible if a moral hazard incentive 
constraint is satisfied: 
 
' ( ) me ic e   (31) 
The objective function (29) is maximised subject above constraint, the IR-h (8) and the IC-l 
(16) constraints. The first order condition for effort is: 
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Notably, the monitoring term is strictly positive and increases the marginal cost of effort.  
Relative to the solution, given by (19), monitoring reduces the land to effort ratio: 
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Result 5.  The regulator monitoring contract is less cost-effective than either the input-based 
or mixed contract, as the second term on the right-hand side of (32) reduces the optimal effort 
to land ratio.  
3.8 Price-based contracts 
Assumption A6. The regulator observes farm types and offers each a price contract based on 
the ES output.  The regulator does not contract directly on inputs or output.  The output 
depends upon the farmer’s supply response for ES output.  The regulator is able to observe 
ES output as a basis of determining the payment. 
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A perfect information price contract is where the regulator acts as a price discriminating 
monopsony and has perfect information about types.  The regulator’s objective function is: 
  i iy ( ) ( , )- y   ,
i
i i y i i i
p
i
Maximum v p c y p i l h     (34) 
subject to: 
 ( ) argmax[ ( , )]     ,i i i i y i iy p p y c y i l h   . (35) 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
' 1 'i
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y ( )
i
y i i i y i i
i i
p
v c y p c y
p

           (36) 
where ( )ip is the price elasticity of conservation output with respect to price  A first-best 
price contract is sub-optimal to a first-best output-based contract and entails less conservation 
output for a given budget due to the cost of paying both types a rent .  For any arbitrary ES 
output, a regulator would prefer to pay the cost rather than an output price. Comparing iyip
and ( , )y i ic y , to incentivise some level of output iy  and 
'= ( , )i y i ip c y , for a strictly convex 
cost function and positive levels of output, ( , )i i y i ip y c y implies that marginal cost is 
greater than the average cost that is 
' ( , ) ( , ) /y i i y i i ic y c y y  .  Thus the transfer payment for a 
given output is higher under a price-based contract than under an output scheme. 
Assumption A7. The same as A6 except that the regulator does not observe type and offers all 
types a single price. 
If only a single price is offered to both producers, then the optimal solution is: 
 ' ' ' '(1 ){ ( , ) ( , )} ( )/( y ( ) y ( )).l y l l h y h h l l h h l l l h h hv c y c y y y p p               (37) 
This is equivalent to (36) except that in each case the expected terms for marginal cost, output 
and the marginal ecosystem output are substituted.  
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Result 6. In a first-best price based contract compared to a first-best input contract the ES  
output is reduced due to the public cost of rent from supplying the ecosystem service. 
Result 7.  If the regulator addresses hidden information by offering a single price, the optimal 
solution is determined by the expected values of first-order condition (37).  The averaging effect 
means that the l-type has output less than or equal to and the h-type an output greater than or 
equal to the first-best price contract.  
3.9 Two-period and repeated contracts 
Assumptions A8. The assumptions are the same as A2 for the input-based contact with 
adverse selection. Specific assumptions for the two-period contract include inputs in the first 
period appreciate the ecosystem asset in both that period and in the second. Producer types 
are stable over the two periods. The initial condition of the ecosystem asset is the same for 
both types at 0y .  A total transfer payment variable is paid for each type 1 2
r
i i if f f  which 
gives the present-value of payments over the two periods.  The farmers and regulator have an 
identical discount factor,  . The duration of periods may be unequal.  
Dynamic contracting in a two-period setting lacks a general solution (Rey and Salanie, 1996).  
A key issue with dynamic contracts is time (in)consistency, in that farmers have incentives to 
not reveal their type due to a concern that the information will disadvantage the agent during 
renegotiation.  Separating contracts may not be incentive compatible if farmers expect the 
regulator to use the information to ‘ratchet-up’ the efficiency required on the basis of the 
information on type (MacKenzie et al, 2008). Further attempts to separate out the l-type by 
providing extra rent in the first period may lead to the h-type selecting the contract intended 
for the l-type and following a ‘take-the-money-and-run’ strategy (Laffont and Tirole, 1988).  
One approach to this problem is to offer a single pooled contract, but this might significantly 
reduce cost effectiveness.  The alternative explored here and in the case study  is for the 
regulator to commit to honour the separating contract over both periods, but negotiate Pareto-
improving terms in the second period based on the revealed information. The general form of 
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the model is due to Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 2). The difference with their model is 
that farmers are investing in an ecosystem asset so that the problem changes through time. 
Commitment by the regulator is critical for investment in ecosystem assets as it can prevent 
incentives that could arise for farmers to first invest in the ecosystem asset and then 
subsequently dis-invest.  Contracting with commitment is viewed as a process of managing 
the ecosystem asset in a transition towards equilibrium where the agent’s type is known and 
they are paid in a long term contract to maintain the equilibrium. At this stage the regulator 
may offer the agent a covenant to permanently protect the asset. In this section we explore this 
transition towards equilibrium. 
The regulator’s objective function over two periods is: 
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(38) 
This is optimised subject to the participation constraints: 
 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) 0        ,
r e x e x
i e i x i i e i x i if c e c x c e c x i l h            (39) 
and the incentive compatibility constraints: 
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. (40) 
The first-order conditions are derived on the basis that the individual rationality constraint for 
the h-type and the incentive compatible constraint for the l-type are binding.  The effort 
conditions are the same for both types: 
 
1 1 1
'
1( ) (1 ) ( , )i i i
e
e y e e iv g g g c e     ;   2
'
2(1 ) ( , )      ,i
e
e e ivg c e i l h    . (41) 
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Effort in the first period increases the ecosystem asset in the first and second period.  In 
common with the static solution (17)  and (18) the optimal land allocation for the low cost 
type is the first-best: 
 
1 1 1
'
1( ) (1 ) ( , )l l l
x
x y x x l lv g g g c x     ;    2
'
2(1 ) ( , )l
x
x x l lvg c x   . (42) 
The h-type marginal condition includes two informational rents one for each period: 
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Embedded in this problem is an issue of the length of contracts and the duration of each stage.  
The regulator may make the first period short so that the performance of firms can be 
observed, possibly by active output monitoring (White, 2005), and the second period longer 
as the regulator offers the farms revised Pareto improving contracts.   
Result 8.  With two period and repeated contracts the regulator may commit to allow the l-
type producer to earn and information rent in both periods.  Any renegotiation cannot make 
the agents worse off.  However, a renegotiation that increases inputs from the h-type in the 
second period and maintains or increases the rent to the l-type may improve cost-
effectiveness. 
Table 1 about here 
 
4 A case study 
The south-west corner of Western Australia is designated by Conservation International as a 
Biodiversity Hotspot (Myers et al., 2000).  This designation indicates a region of high 
endemic plant biodiversity, and yet one which is under a high level of threat from agriculture. 
For instance, the NEWROC (Northeast Wheatbelt Regional Organisation of Councils) region 
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has only around 12% of its indigenous, native vegetation remaining.  The role of input and 
output based agri-environmental schemes in protecting this ecosystem and the characteristics 
of the study region is described in detail by White and Sadler (2012).   
The remaining biodiversity in the region is found in remnant woodland, shrub and mallee 
heath, collectively termed “bush remnants”.  The threats to biodiversity include land clearing 
for cereal and sheep production (although further clearing is banned), the encroachment of 
agricultural weeds, and sheep grazing.  Management practices include excluding sheep 
through fencing, weeding and replanting.  The regulator (the Western Australian Department 
of Parks and Wildlife) can identify the area of land that is fenced and included in a 
conservation scheme at low cost. However, other conservation efforts by the farmer are 
almost impossible to observe and record in a way that is legally enforceable.  Similarly, the 
management of sheep grazing is difficult to observe at the individual farm.  The opportunity 
cost of the labour element of conservation effort is difficult to observe and highly variable 
(White and Sadler, 2012). This is a region where land sparing rather than land sharing 
(Balmford et al, 2012) is the best strategy, as the ecosystem benefits are relatively low on land 
planted to crops or used for grazing. 
The nature of the ecosystem services provided by remnant bush is complex.  It includes 
biodiversity conservation, sequesting carbon and reducing the rate of dryland salinity spread.  
The social value of these components is likely to be context specific and highly variable.  
Non-market valuation of biodiversity protection for Western Australia have indicated high 
values and shows that the Western Australian population has some awareness of the diversity 
of flowering plants in such areas (Burton et al., 2012). Ecosystem output measurement is 
feasible and reasonably inexpensive if it is undertaken by remote sensing either through aerial 
photographs or satellite data.  In contrast, field surveys of ecological condition, due to the 
remoteness of the region, are costly. As the authors show, a bush condition metric (crudely a 
measure of tree and understorey) is highly variable.  This is partly due to the Western 
Australian environment which is prone to droughts and fires.  Therefore risk aversion is 
potentially an issue for outcome-based payment schemes.  The farms are large with an 
average size of farms surveyed 6593ha with a high level of capital investment and low level 
of labour.  Despite their large size, most farms employ only one person and can be 
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categorized as family farms. The duration of ecosystem service contracts is important.  Any 
change in the bush management would probably take about three years to take effect, with a 
significant change after six to ten years (Prober and Smith, 2009).  There is a distinct 
possibility that the bush could deteriorate if there is sub-optimal effort. We use this system to 
show the relative properties of the contract types described in Section 3, based on the 
simulation modelling reported in White and Sadler (op cit). 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 1 shows parameter values and functional forms. The results in Table 2 show that where 
there is perfect information the regulator can achieve the same level of efficiency with an 
input contract (contract 1) and an output contract (contract 3).  In the case of hidden land 
productivity, an input contract (contract 2) is slightly more efficient than an output contract 
(contract 4).  Mixed contracts (contract 5) which target land and output are as efficient at 
addressing adverse selection as an input contract and can also induce a farmer to supply an 
optimal level of effort.  This is an interesting result that holds trivially for the case of two 
inputs but in more complex policy settings may suggest that regulators should consider 
targeting more observable variables, which then provides an indirect incentive to manage 
inputs that are unobservable. 
Table 3 here 
First best price contracts (contract 6) and single price contracts (contract 7) are less efficient 
than contracts 1 through to 5. This is due to the shadow cost of taxation and the producer 
surplus (rent). These two contracts raise an issue about whether in the long term it is better to 
allow farmers to profit from providing ecosystem services much in the same way as they 
profit from providing market goods.  From a cost-effectiveness viewpoint, most attention has 
been on devising agri-environment schemes which extract all rent from participants, but this 
might not always be the best long-run option. Note also that a pricing approach would place 
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an emphasis upon the ability of the regulator to estimate the non-market and market values of 
ES outputs as the price should be set relative to the ES value. 
Table 3 gives results for the two-period input-based commitment model.  The first-best 
solution (contract 9) provides a benchmark.  Notice that the inputs increase in period two as 
the increase in the ecosystem asset raises their marginal products.  The mechanism design 
solution (contract 10) reduces land and effort input for the high cost type.  The renegotiation 
proof contract (contract 11) offers the mechanism design menu for both periods in the first 
period, but also implies that any renegotiation in the second cannot make farmers worse off.  
The solution shows that there is a modest increase in social welfare from this contract relative 
to the mechanism design contract.  The rent of the l-type farmer is the same as that for 
mechanism design and the high cost type switches to a first best level of land and effort given 
the ecosystem asset at the end of the first period.  It is for this reason that the input levels are 
slightly less than for the first best. 
5 Conclusions 
In their assessment of European agri-environmental policy the European Court of Auditors 
(2011) conclude:  “The Court found that the objectives determined by the Member States are 
numerous and not specific enough for assessing whether or not they have been achieved. … In 
particular, very little information was available on the environmental benefits of agri-
environment payments. (European Court of Auditors, 2011, p7).  
This paper identified a series of results that offer insights into the problems inherent in such a 
policy design process.  First, with perfect information about farm type, the regulator is 
indifferent between offering an input-based or output-based contract. However, we know that 
such observability is unlikely to describe many (any) real-world situations. The next key 
finding extends a result by Khalil and Lawaree (1995) to the case where there are two inputs 
(one observable by the regulator and the other not) and shows that there is an efficiency gain 
from using input-based contracts to address adverse selection.  This result hinges on the 
ability of the regulator to minimize the informational rent by adjusting the effort to land ratio 
away from the cost minimizing solution. The next result shows that if the regulator is able to 
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measure the ES output and contract on it, then they can provide an incentive for an optimal 
level of the unobservable effort and informational rent. Result 4 shows that contracting on 
output eliminates the requirement for explicit effort monitoring. 
A price-based contract that pays on ES output is attractive in terms of its administrative 
requirement as it only requires output monitoring.  However, fixed price contracts are 
relatively costly to the regulator as they pay more rent to farmers (Hanley et al, 2012; 
Armsworth et al, 2012).  
Results for multi-period adverse selection and renegotiation are complex and are approached 
here by assuming regulator commitment and only allowing Pareto improving renegotiation in 
the second period.  This is appropriate in many contracts for ecosystem services, such as the 
native bush example, where significant gains to society derive from long term protection.  
Spot contracting, especially where paying on inputs only, is usually not optimal as it can lead 
to cycles of ecosystem asset appreciation and depreciation if there are gaps in the contract 
(Iossa and Rey, 2015).  The practical implications of the results here are that in a multi-period 
contract setting, even if the contracts are on inputs, it is advisable to measure output as well as 
imposing an additional condition for recontracting. The duration of the contract stages is also 
important.  There may be a case for a short initial period (say 3 years in the empirical example 
described above) that allows the farmer to signal to the regulator their type before the 
regulator engages in Pareto improving renegotiation. This renegotiation  sets up a long term 
contract (over 10 years, for instance) with a condition on renegotiation at the end of the 
second period. 
The farmer can be seen as making a sunk investment in the ecosystem asset that provides 
future ecosystem services.  If the farmer continues to own the asset, and on the basis that only 
the regulator is prepared to pay for a public good, there is the danger to the farmer of the 
regulator withdrawing support and the farmer not receiving a return on investment, similarly 
society may not benefit from the investment if the farmer does not continue to participate.  
These issues strays into the domain of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore, 1990; Tirole, 
1999) and is a question for further research. 
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Our results have been obtained by analysis of simplified models combined with a simulation 
of an actual policy setting.  There are limitations to this approach and there is a requirement 
for further research into more complex settings, especially those relating to repeated 
contracting and end-of-contact problems (Kuhfuss et al, 2015) and contracting with groups of 
agents  (Herzfeld and Jongeneel, 2012). 
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Appendix 1 Input-based contracts asymmetric information 
The analysis of the theoretical model is greatly simplified by the fact that the IC for the l-type 
farm and the IR constraint for the h-type farm are the only constraints that are binding  
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993, p59) The incentive compatibility constraint for the low 
cost farmer (IC-l)  is: 
 ( ( , ) ( , )) ( ( , ) ( , ))e x e xl e l x l l h e h x l hf c e c x f c e c x         (A1) 
The individual rationality constraint for the h-type (IR-h) ( ( , ) ( , )) 0e xh e h x h hf c e c x   
implies: 
 ( ( , ) ( , )) ( ( , ) ( , )) ( ( , ) ( , )) 0e x e x e xl e l x l l e h x h h e h x l hf c e c x c e c x c e c x             
As hf  is at least ( ( , ) ( , ))
e x
e h x h hc e c x  , Thus we can ignore the IR-l constraint as it is 
implied by IC-l 
If we now optimize (15) with respect to IC-l  and IR-h it is possible to check that IC-h is 
satisfied from the first order conditions (17) and (18), l hx x  and l he e  
If we restate the IC-l  constraint: 
 
(( ( , ) ( , )) ( ( , ) ( , ))
   ( , ) ( , )
e x e x
l h e h x l h e h x h h
x x
h x l h x h h
r r c e c x c e c x
r c x c x
   
 
    
  
 
Where ir is the rent The IC-h is: 
(( ( , ) ( , )) ( ( , ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , )e x e x x xh l e l x h l e l x l l l x h l x l lr r c e c x c e c x r c x c x             . 
Bringing the constraints  together: 
0 ( ( , ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , )x x x xx h h x l h x h l x l lc x c x c x c x       . 
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The assumption that the IC-h constraint is implied by the IR-h and IC-l constraints holds as 
long as  '''( , ) 0xx i ic x   
Appendix 2 Equivalency between mixed contracts and second-best input-based contracts 
The regulator maximizes: 
 i
, ,
( , ( , )) ( , ( , )) ( , )-   ,
i i i
e x
i i i i i e i i i x i i
x y f
i
Maximum vg x e x y c e x y c x f i l h       
Subject to the participation for the high-cost type  
( , ( , )) ( , ) 0 e xh e h h x h hf c e x y c x     
and incentive compatibility constraint for the low cost type: 
( , ( , )) ( , ) ( , ( , )) ( , )e x e xl e l l x l l h e h h x l hf c e x y c x f c e x y c x         
Both constraints enter as equalities. The four first order conditions for lx , ly , hx , hy are:  
' '(1 ) ( , )+(1 ) ( , ( , ))e
e
l
l l l
x e
x l i e i i x
e x x
c x c e x y
v
g g
    


     (A21) 
'(1 ) ( , ( , ))
l
e
e i i
e
c e x y
v
g
 
         (A22) 
' ' '
' ' '
( , )+ ( , ( , ))e ( / )( ( , )
( ( , ) ( , ( , ))e ( , ( , ))e )
e
h
h h
h h h
x e x
x h h e i i x h x h h
x e e
l x l h e h h x l e h h x
e x x
c x c e x y c x
c x c e x y c e x y
v
g g
    
    
 
 
    

   (A23) 
'
' '(1 ) ( , ( , )) ( ( , ( , )) ( , ( , )))
h
e
e ee h h l
e h h e h h
e h
c e x y
v c e x y c e x y
g
  
 


     (A24) 
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First we establish that the low cost farmer selects the first-best solution.  Rearrange (A22) to 
give: 
'(1 ) ( , ( , ))
l
e
e e i ivg c e x y           (A25)  
and (A22) to give: 
' '( e ) (1 ) ( , )+(1 ) ( , ( , ))e
l l l l
x e
e x x x l i e i i xv g g c x c e x y           (A26) 
Substituting for 
le
vg : 
' ' '(1 ) ( , ( , ))e (1 ) ( , )+(1 ) ( , ( , ))e
l l l
e x e
e i i x x x l i e i i xc e x y vg c x c e x y           
This simplifies to: 
 
'(1 ) ( , )
l
x
x x l ivg c x    
Establishing that the solution is identical to the optimal solution to the input-based contract  
On the basis of (A24) effort is also identical. 
The area and effort for the high cost farmer can also be shown to be the same as for the input-
based contract. From (A24) the last term is zero as the effort costs are identical and 
rearranging:  
'(1 ) ( , ( , ))
h
e
e e h hvg c e x y          (A27) 
Rearranging (A23) and substituting in (A27) adding and subtracting ' ( , )xx h hc x   to the rhs 
and rearranging: 
' ' ' '
' ' ' '
(1 ) ( , ( , ))e (1 ) ( , ) ( , )+ ( , ( , ))e
( / )( ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ( , ))e ( , ( , ))e )
h h h
h h
e x x e
e h h x x x h h x h h e h h x
x x e e
h x h h l x l h e h h x l e h h x
c e x y vg c x c x c e x y
c x c x c e x y c e x y
      
       
     
    
34 
Using the fact that 
' ' '( , ( , ))e ( , ( , ))e ( , ( , ))e
h h h
e e e
e i i x l e i i x h e i i xc e x y c e x y c e x y       
' ' '
' ' '
(1 ) ( , ( , ))e (1 ) ( , )+(1+ ) ( , ( , ))e
( / )( ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ))
h h h
e x e
e h h x x x h h e i i x
x x x
h h x h h x h h l x l h
c e x y vg c x c e x y
c x c x c x
     
      
    
    
This simplifies to: 
' ' '(1 ) ( , )+( / )( ( , ) ( ( , ))
h
x x x
x x h h l h x h h l x l hvg c x c x c x          
and this is identical to the first order condition for the input-based contract (18). 
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Table 1 Notation used in theoretical and empirical models 
Symbol Description Unit Value/functional form 
Indices:   
i,j Farm type (land productivity)  , [ , ]i j l h  
t Time period  [0,1, 2]t   
Parameters:   
x
i  Land productivity parameter f   40;   1.5
x x x
l h l     
e
i  Effort productivity   10;
e
   
ap  Agricultural commodity price (for example wheat) $t-1  
aw  Agricultural input prices, for instance fertilizer $per unit  
t
  Discount factor at time t Per cent (1/(1 ))
t t
r    
i
  Probability that a firm is of type i  0.8; 0.2; l h    
v  Is the economic value per unit of ecosystem service $ unit metric 1000 
  Shadow cost of tax funds $-1 0.1,  
  Fine for non-compliance on effort $ per unit effort $500 
Variables:   
a
ix  
Fixed land area available for agriculture and 
conservation 
ha  
e ai  Fixed effort available for agriculture and conservation hours  
ix  Land allocated from agriculture to conservation ha  
ei  Effort allocated from agriculture to conservation hours  
yti  Ecosystem output metric 0 1y   
tif  Transfer payment from the regulator to farmer $  
tip  Output payment 
$ per unit of 
metric 
 
ir  Rent  $  
im  Monitoring frequency  0 1im   
Functions:    
( , , , , , e )x e a ai i i ip w x  
 
Agricultural profit as  a restricted profit function $  
( , , ,e )x ei i i ic x   Compliance cost function  $  
( , )xx i ic x  Opportunity cost of land  $ 
1( )xi ix
 1 1.5;   
( , )ee i ic e  Opportunity cost of effort $ 
2
2 1.5;( ) ; 
e
i ie

   3 
 
( , )y i tic y  
Minimum cost for firm i to produce ecosystem output 
yti  
  
1y ( , , y )ti ti ti t ig x e   Ecosystem production function   metric 
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1 0
bb b
t i ti ti tiy b x e y   
0 1 2 31; 0.6; 0.2; 0.1;b b b b     
cm  Cost of full monitoring  $1000 
Note: Unless otherwise stated parameters taken from White and Sadler, (2012) 1.  The land cost is based on the opportunity cost of land for sheep grazing and 
the cost of maintaining fencing .. 2. Estimated from the results of a choice modelling survey Burton et al (2012, p7) 3. The parameters 2 2,  are set equal to 
ensure homogeneity of the cost function in the inputs  This ensures that the effort to land ratio is constant where cost is minimized 
36 
 
Table 2 Case study contracts 
 J 
le  he  lx  hx  ly  hy  lf  hf    
Contracts 
Social 
welfare 
Effort 
low-cost 
Effort 
high-
cost 
Land 
low-
cost 
Land 
high-
cost 
Output 
low-
cost 
Output 
high-
cost 
Transfer 
payment 
low-cost 
Transfer 
payment 
high-cost 
Rent l Rent h 
Input-based            
1. First-best 13636 105.677 97.81 20.16 14.24 29.87 26.61 14484 12900 0 0 
2. Mechanism design 
13556 105.67 95.71 20.16 12.91 29.87 25.75 15412 12147 928 0 
3.  Moral Hazard 13233 105.36 90.73 20.13 12.60 29.81 24.82 15323 11325 894 0 
Frequency of monitoring effort: 031 029         
Output-based            
4. First-best 13636 105.67 97.82 20.16 14.24 29.87 26.61 14484 12900 0 0 
5. Mechanism Design output 13553 105.67 93.74 20.16 13.65 29.87 25.71 15492 12100 1008 0 
6. Mixed output/land-based 13556 105.67 95.71 20.16 12.91 29.87 25.75 15412 12147 928 0 
Price-based1        pl ph   
7. First-best-price contract 12291     27.37 22.21 842.11  776.13 10756 8043 
8.  Single price contract 12276     26.89 23.95 829.27 829.27 10408 9270 
Note:  The price contracts are based on a slightly modified example where the ecosystem production function parameter is modified to 
b0=0.95 for the high cost  With the baseline set of parameters the solutions are identical 
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Table 3 Case study two-period input contracts  
 J 
tle  the  tlx  thx  tly  thy  
r
lf  
r
hf    
Contracts 
Social 
welfare 
Effort 
low-cost 
Effort 
high-
cost 
Land 
low-
cost 
Land 
high-
cost 
Output 
low-
cost 
Output 
high-
cost 
Transfer 
payment 
low-cost 
Transfer 
payment 
high-cost 
Rent l Rent h 
Input-based            
9. First-best            
t=1  132.37 121.97 25.25 17.76 35.77 31.74     
t=2  176.16 160.30 33.61 23.34 64.30 55.81     
Total 40898       49919 43669 0 0 
10. Mechanism  design  
           
t=1  132.37 119.19 25.25 16.08 35.77 30.69     
t=2  176.16 156.10 33.61 21.06 64.16 53.63     
Total 40628       53045 40916 3125 0 
11. Renegotiation             
t=1  132.37 119.19 25.25 16.08 35.77 30.69     
t=2  176.16 159.53 33.61 23.23 64.30 55.41     
Total 40639       53045 42405 3125 0 
 
 
